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I. JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1987) granting appeals from district
court in criminal cases involving a second degree felony.

II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction entered in
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, Criminal Case
No. 18985.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of distributing a controlled

substance, cocaine, a schedule two substance in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8 (1) (A) (II) (1986).

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the trial court erred in finding

Appellant's prior

felony

conviction admissible under Rule 609 (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE
Utah R. Evidence 609 (1988).
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, David Davis, was charged by information with distribution
of a controlled substance (cocaine) in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8
(1) (A) (II) (1986) as the result of a buy-rip narcotics transaction, which
occurred on June 14, 1988 (R.l).

Davis was serving time in the Salt Lake

County jail, as part of his probation on a cocaine distribution offense, when
he met Mario Trujillo, who was in jail on a work-release program on a
conviction for cocaine distribution. (T.2).

Shortly after Davis was released

from jail, Trujillo went to narcotics officers and offerred to set up a "crack"
purchase with Davis in exchange for Trujillo getting out of jail two weeks
earlier than scheduled. (T.17).
The narcotics officers accepted Trujillo's offer and proceeded to set
up a buy-rip transaction between Trujillo and Davis. (T.17).

Trujillo had

arranged to meet Davis at a basketball court that day where the sale of
cocaine would take place.

Wearing a "bug" and while being observed by

narcotics officers, Trujillo met Davis as planned and gave him $500 in
exchange for $1,000 worth of cocaine.

Following this exchange, narcotics

officers immediately arrested Davis. (T.18).
occurred while he was on
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After Davis'

arrest, which

probation for another offense, probation officers searched his apartment
and found $1,500 in a jacket pocket which contained cocaine residue and a
couple of plastic baggies which contained marijuana residue. (T.lll).
Prior to trial, Davis filed a motion to exclude evidence of his prior
conviction for the same offense in the event he testified, pursuant to Rule
609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (R.36). The trial court denied the motion
and the case proceeded to trial by a jury.

(T.10).

Defense counsel argued

that, because the prior conviction was for the same offense, its probative
value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect to the defendant.

The State,

on the other hand, claimed that testimony as to the prior conviction was
integral to its case because it was necessary to establish that its witness,
Trujillo, met Davis while the two were in jail on drug offenses and to
explain why Davis was subjected to a search by probation officers. (T.10).
Davis renewed the motion at trial and the court again denied the motion.
(R.181).

The trial court, in balancing the probative value of the prior

conviction against its probative effect,

found

that it would be more

prejudicial not to let the jury know why Davis was in jail and let them
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conjecture then to allow the evidence in with a limiting instruction. (T.12).
The court found further, with respect to the nearness in time of the prior
conviction, that it was directly related to Davis' credibility as a witness.
(T.12).
Consequently, the prior conviction came in as evidence both through
Trujillo, the State's witness, who testified that he met Davis in jail where
Davis told him that he was serving time for distribution of cocaine (T.72)
and through

Davis 1 own testimony

(R. 196-204).

Davis was convicted and this appeal followed.

which contradicted

that of

Trujillo.

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Davis' prior conviction for distribution of cocaine was not admissible
under 609 (a) (2) because it is not a crime which involves dishonesty or
false statement.

Even if it did involve dishonesty or false statement, it was

nonetheless inadmissible because the trial court did not make an inquiry
into the underlying facts of the prior conviction.
The prior conviction

was also not admissible under 609 (a) (1)

because its probabtive value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
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In

this

regard,

the

trial

court

erred

in

its

improper

balancing

process,

particularly in finding that it would be more prejudicial to exclude the
conviction, and in its limited and erroneous application of the

Banner

criteria, specifically with respect to the similarity of the prior conviction
with that of the crime charged.

Accordingly, the prior conviction should

have been excluded under Rule 609 (a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

VII. ARGUMENT
APPELLANTS PRIOR CONVICTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 609 (a) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE BECAUSE ITS PROBATIVE
VALUE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.

Rule 609 (a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law which he was convicted, and
the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless
of the punishment.
Utah R. Evidence 609 (a) (1989).
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As a preliminary matter, though the trial court did not specifically
articulate whether it found Davis1 prior conviction for cocaine distribution
admissible under
distribution

609 (a) (1) or (2), it is clear

of cocaine does not involve dishonesty

that the
of false

offense

of

statement.

"While all crimes involve, in the broad sense, an element of dishonesty, not
all crimes necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement for purposes of
609 (a) (2). State v. Wight. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 31 (Ct. App. December 1,
1988).
Due to the difficulty

involved

in distinguishing

between

crimes

involving "dishonesty and false statement" and those which do not, this
court has recommended that the trial courts inquire about the particular
facts involved to determine if dishonesty of false statement was involved
in the commission of the crime.

State v. Brown. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 26

(Ct. App. April 14, 1988); State v. Wight. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31.

While

this proceedure is discretionary with the trial court, when the court does
not make an inquiry into the underlying facts and the appellate court
cannot determine from the record if the prior crime involved dishonesty of
false statement, the prior conviction is inadmissible under 609 (a) (2).

-6-

See

e.g., B r o w n , at 26 (where trial court did not inquire into facts of prior
misdemeanor
information

theft
court

dishonesty or false

convictions,
could

not

and

State

determine

statement, prior theft

did

not provide

whether

background

convictions

convictions

were

involved

inadmissible

under 609 (a) (2).); W i g h t , at 31 (since no inquiry about underlying facts
was made by trial court, court could not determine if the actual crime
involved dishonesty or false statement, therefore, prior robbery conviction
was inadmissible under 609 (a) (2).).
In this case, as in Brown and Wight, the trial court made no inquiry
about the underlying facts of the prior conviction, nor did the State provide
any background information.
the record
statement.

whether

the prior

Therefore this court cannot determine from
conviction

involved

dishonesty

or

false

Accordingly, even if the crime of distribution of cocaine could,

arguably, be construed to involve dishonesty or false statement, which it
can't, it is nonetheless inadmissible under 609 (a) (2).
A defendant who testifies on his own behalf can be impeached by
evidence of his prior felony convictions, not including dishonesty or false
statement under 609 (a) (1) only if "the court determines that the
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probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986).

effect."

Factors the court should

consider in balancing the probative value of a prior conviction against its
prejudicial effect pursuant to 609 (a) (1) are:
[1]

the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character
for veracity of the witness.

[2]

the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction

[3]

the similarity of the prior crime to the charged crime,
insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to
punish the accused as a bad person.

[4]

the importance of credibility issues in determining the
truth in a prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial
evidence . . . .

[5]

the importance of the accused's testimony, as perhaps
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative
of the accused's character for veracity . . . .

. . . .

Id. at 1334.

As a threshold issue, this court in Wight, found that, in determining
whether a conviction

is admissible under 609 (a) (1) the record

must

reflect that the trial court utilized the Banner criteria and the balancing of
the probative value versus prejudicial effect in order for its admissibility
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to be upheld upon review.

IcL at 32.

In this regard, while the trial court

inadvertently incorporated some of the Banner criteria into its ruling, it did
not even consider or make a determination as to several of the factors
enumerated in B a n n e r .

For example, the court mentioned "nearness" in

time, "credibility", and the "similarity" of the prior conviction which are
included in the first three B a n n e r factors, but the ruling is bereft of any
discussion of findings as to the fourth and fifth B a n n e r

criteria dealing

with the importance of credibility issues in the case and the accused's
testimony.
With respect to the balancing process required by Banner, the court
found, in a novel approach, that, since Trujillo's testimony that he met
Davis in jail was integral to the State's case, it was more prejudicial to Davis
to exclude the conviction because of the risk that the jury would speculate
as to why he was in jail and why his house was searched by probation
officers.

(T.10-12).

However, in balancing the probative value of the

conviction against its prejudicial effect the court is required to assess the
prejudicial effect

to the defendant

of letting the conviction in. not the

prejudicial effect

of keeping it o u t .

In any event, if the conviction is

otherwise not probative, as the court conceeded it was the defendant ought
-9-

to be able to assess the prejudicial effect of excluding the conviction and
choose whether to run that risk.
Accordingly, since the trial court did not utilize the Banner criteria in
its ruling nor did it properly apply the balancing of probative value versus
prejudicial effect, this court should find, as it did in W i g h t , that the court
erred in finding the prior conviction admissible.
In referring to the first B a n n e r factor, the nature of the crime, as
bearing on the character for veracity of the witness, the court found that, if
the prior conviction were not integral to the State's case, the probative
value would not be there "as it doesn't weigh heavily on his credibility.
(T.12).

That is that the "sale of cocaine does not necessarily affect his

credibility as a witness, per se." (Id.)

However, the court stated that the

fact that Davis had been recently convicted of the same offense

affects

whether he's been forthright in . . . the answers he gives on the same
offense." (Id..)

Consequently, the court found with respect to the recentness

or nearness in time of the prior conviction that it was "directly related to
truthfulness" and could be considered for credibility purposes. (T.12-13).
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This

finding

misconstrues

the

second

Banner

factor

involving

"recentness" and directly contravenes the purpose behind the third Banner
factor which requires the court to consider the "similarity of the prior
crime to the charged crime insofar as a close resemblence may lead the
jury to punish the accused as a bad person."

The court found that the sale

of cocaine did not inherently reflect on Davis' character for truth and
veracity while at the same time finding that its "recentness" did reflect on
his truthfulness.

Under the second factor, those prior convictions which are

more remote in time are morelikely to be excluded because they generally
have less probative value.

See e.g.. B a n n e r ,

at 1335 (remoteness

was

significant factor in court's balancing process where prior convictions were
between eight and nine years old and would have been
excluded under 609 (b) if ten years old).

automatically

However, this does not mean that

if a prior conviction is recent it is automatically admissible particularly
when the prior conviction is for the same offense as that charged.
While the risk of undue prejudice is substantial when any
is used for impeachment

purposes, it is even

conviction

greater when the prior

conviction is similar or identical to the crime charged because of the
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likelihood that the jury will think "he did it before, he must have done it
this time."

For example, in Banner, where the defendant was charged with

two sexual offenses, the court found that the defendant's prior convictions
for assault with intent to commit rape "would be extremely prejudicial and
tend to inflame the jury, in any case dealing with sex crimes, and therefore
excluded the convictions.

Id.., 717 P.2d at 1335.

Likewise, in State v.

G e n t r y . 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987) the court found that ihe similarity
between the defendant's prior conviction for rape and the crime for which
he was tried, aggravated sexual assault, was "highly likely to prejudice
jurors and unduly influence their conclusion concerning [the]

defendant's

guilt." Id. at 1037.
In this case, Davis' prior conviction was for the exact same offense as
that for which he was on trial.

In this regard, other courts have recognized

that when "the prior crime parallels that for which the defendant-witness
is being tried, the quantum of prejudice to the defendant is magnified" and
the evidence should be excluded.
893 (D.C. NY 1976).

United States v. Brown. 409 F. Supp. 890,

Since Davis' prior conviction for distribution of cocaine

parallels that for which he was being tried, the prejudicial effect to him
was magnified.

Therefore, the prior conviction should have been excluded.
-12-

Finally, the trial court made no finding as to the accused's testimony
and the importance of credibility in this case as required by the fourth and
fifth

Banner

factors.

In B a n n e r ,

the court

found

that

"the

accused

testimony and the importance of credibility in this case were critical in
determining whose version of the facts were correct since the prosecution's
case

included

no

decisive

non-testimonial

evidence."

IcL at 1335.

Similarly, in this case, the prosecution had no non-testimonial evidence; it's
entire case rested on the testimony of Trujillo and the narcotics officers.
The fifth Banner factor requires the court to consider the importance
of

the

accused

testimony

"as

perhaps

warranting

the

convictions probative of the accused's character for veracity."

exclusion

of

That is, even

where a conviction might bear on the defendant's capacity for truthfulness,
it should be excluded if the accused's testimony is critical to the case.

In

this regard the court in Banner, stated:
Consideration of the testimony's prejudicial effect is
expecially pertinent when the witness is the defendant
in a criminal prosecution . . . . This is particularly important,
when, as here, the prior conviction is for the same type
of crime involved in the matter under present consideration.
In this type of situation, the probative value of the evidence
as affecting the party's credibility will rarely outweigh the
resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and the prejudice
to the party.
Id. at 1334 n. 44 (quoting Terry v. ZionsCoop-Mercantile Inst.. Utah
605 P.2d 314, 325 (1979)).
-13-

Since Davis' testimony was critical in determining whose version of
the facts were correct, Trujillo's or his, and the prior conviction was for the
same offense, the probative value could not have outweighed the resulting
confusion

of the issues in dispute and the prejudice to Davis.

This is

particularly true given the "complete lack of connection" between the crime
of distribution of cocaine and Davis' veracity.

See e.g.. State v. Gentry. 747

P.2d

should

1032,

convictions
crimes

1038 (Utah

1987) (trial court

where there was complete

of escape

and rape

have excluded

lack of connection

on defendant's

veracity

and

prior

between
the

the

similarity

between the conviction and crime charged was great).
In conclusion, Davis' prior conviction did not involve his honesty or
false statement and therefore was not admissible under 609 (a) (2).

Even

if it did involve dishonesty or false statement, absent an inquiry by the
court into the underlying facts of the prior conviction, it is not admissible.
The trial court did not properly

utilize

the B a n n e r

criteria

and

the

balancing of the probative value versus prejudicial effect, in determining
the admissibility of the prior conviction under 609 (a) (1), therefore, the
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trial court's ruling should not be upheld by this court upon review.

In

addition, the trial court erred both in its improper balancing of probative
value

versus

prejudicial

effect

and

in

its

inadequate

and

incorrect

application of the Banner criteria particularly with respect to its finding as
to the similiarity of the prior conviction to the crime charged.

Accordingly,

Davis1 prior conviction should have been excluded by the trial court under
Rule 609 (a) (2).

IIX. CONCLUSION

Based on the authorities presented, Appellant seeks reversal of his
conviction and a new trial excluding the prior conviction as evidence.

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
PATRICIA GEARY
Attorney's for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's
Brief was mailed on this
day of July, 1989 via first class mail,
postage prepaid to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Addendum "A"
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Cited in State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377,
489 P 2d 1191 (1971) (referred to in Committee
Note), State v Hubbard, 601 P 2d 929 (Utah

Rule

609

1979), State v Shabata, 678 P 2d 785 (Utah
1984), State v Tarafa, 720 P 2d 1368 (Utah
1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Admissibility and effect, on issue
of party's credibility or merits of his case, of
evidence of attempts to intimidate or influence
witness in civil action, 4 A L R 4th 829

Rule 609. Impeachment
crime.

Contingent fee informant testimony in state
prosecutions, 57 A L R 4 t h 643

by evidence of conviction

of

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence t h a t he h a s been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines t h a t
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if
a period of more t h a n ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or
of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for t h a t conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, t h a t t h e probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of p a r d o n , annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and t h a t person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) J u v e n i l e a d j u d i c a t i o n s . Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) P e n d e n c y of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an
appeal is admissible.

